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Discrimination by Gender in Automobile Insurance: A
Note on Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v.
Insurance Commissioner
Richard A. Miller*

On September 27, 1984, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided that automobile insurance rates based on the gender of the
insured were "unfairly discriminatory" under Pennsylvania law.'
Philip V. Mattes, who filed a complaint with the Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner challenging the legality of gender-based
rates, was insured by the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company; as a 26 year old male with no accident history he paid a
premium of $360, while a similarly situated female paid $212,
about 40 percent less for identical coverage. No differences existed
other than sex. The Commonwealth's Insurance Commissioner disapproved Hartford's rate plan based on gender. The commonwealth court upheld the disapproval, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed.
The Pennsylvania Surety Rate Regulation Act (Rate Act) requires due consideration not only of actuarial or underwriting
practice, judgment, and experience but also of all other factors
within and outside the Commonwealth.2 Classification of risks is
allowed for rate making purposes, s but, under section 3(d), rates
4
"shall not be excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory.
An earlier Pennsylvania case held that "actuarial soundness cannot be the sole test of the validity of a rate, .
[hence] actuarial
*

B.A., 1952, Oberlin College; M.A., 1957, Ph.D., 1962, Yale University. Professor of

Economics, Wesleyan University; Visiting Professor of Economics, Yale University, Spring
Term, 1985.
1. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Insurance Comm'r of Pa., 65 Pa. Commw.
249, 442 A.2d 382, a/I'd, 482 A.2d 542 (1984) (decided under section 3(d) of the Casualty
and Surety Rate Regulation Act, June 11, 1947, P.L. 538, § 3(d), 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
1183(d) (Purdon 1971)).
2. P.L. 538 § 3(a), 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1183(a) (Purdon 1982).
3. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1183(c).
4. Id. § 1183(d).
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justification does not operate without a limit,"' despite the stipulation that the rates were actuarially sound and hence not in dispute.
In the latter case, a possibly important variable had been omitted
in the actuarial calculations for hospitalization insurance rates for
the elderly; the Commissioner disapproved, and the commonwealth
court declined to interfere. Thus, actuarial soundness has been
held in Pennsylvania not to provide a complete defense to the level
of insurance rates.
In Hartford v. Insurance Commissioner, the commonwealth
court likewise upheld the Commissioner's decision, holding that
the Commissioner was well within his discretionary authority to
consider the Equal Rights Amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution' as a relevant "other factor" under the Rate Act to avoid
"unfair discrimination" based on sex. The court concluded that the
Commissioner "considered the actuarial factors and also, as required by section 3(a) 'all other relevant factors within and outside
the Commonwealth,' in determining that the sex-based auto insurance rate classification was 'inherently unfairly discriminatory' be'7
cause it failed to treat 'equals equally'."
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court initiated its affirmation of the
commonwealth court's ruling by assuming that discrimination
based on sex existed: "There is no attempt to suggest that Mattes
was not in fact discriminated against because of his sex. The inquiry must begin by accepting that a gender based discrimination
exists. The question to be resolved is whether such discrimination
falls within the parameters of the Rate Act's prohibition against
5. 65 Pa. Commw. at 255-56, 442 A.2d at 385 (quoting Capitol Blue Cross v. Insurance
Dep't, 34 Pa. Commw. 584, 383 A.2d 1306 (1978), a case not involving discrimination by
sex).
6. "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because of the sex of the individual." PA. CONST. art. I, § 28. Hartford argued that the Commissioner had exceeded his statutory authority. According to the
insurance regulations, "This Chapter does not prohibit insurers from differentiating in premium rates between sexes where there is sound actuarial justification." 31 PA. ADMIN. CODE
§ 145.1, implementing the Unfair Insurance Practices Act of July 22, 1974, P.L. 589, 4D PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1171-1171.15 (Purdon 1982). See 65 Pa. Commw. at 257, 442 A.2d at
386.
7. 65 Pa. Commw. at 258, 442 A.2d at 386. President Judge Crumlish dissented on the
ground that the decision "unduly extends the Insurance Commissioner's authority." Id. at
258, 442 A.2d at 387 (Crumlish, J., dissenting). The Commissioner, he argued, "has strayed
beyond the bounds of the insurance field and into the sphere of policy determination, an
area properly reserved to the elected body." Id. at 260, 442 A.2d at 387 (Crumlish, J., dissenting). The Commissioner, the judge felt, should have limited himself to consideration of
"actuarial evidence."
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'unfairly discriminatory rates'." The supreme court maintained
that section 3(d)'s phrase "unfairly discriminatory" would be
"mere surplusage"9 if actuarial considerations (allowed in other
sections of the Rate Act) were all that were necessary to justify
differential rates between men and women; section 3(d) must have
some meaning beyond "actuarial fairness," otherwise the section
would be "redundant," with "no independent effect." The Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment was likewise relevant to the
court. Hartford's sex-based rates "rely on and perpetuate stereotypes similar to those condemned" in a series of cases brought
under the amendment.' 0 "Unquestionably, sex discrimination in
this Commonwealth is now unfair discrimination . . To read
the term 'unfairly discriminatory' as excluding sex discrimination
would contradict the plain mandate of the Equal Rights Amendment to our Pennsylvania Constitution.""
The difficulty with the court's decision in Hartford is the controlling assumption that discrimination existed in the first place.
The court started with this assumption, and thus neglected any
serious consideration of what should be the basic and initial question: did discrimination in a meaningful way actually exist? Assumption of an answer cannot suffice for considered argument, of
which there was none. The case should have turned, but did not,
on the issue of whether true discrimination existed. My argument
here is that the court's analysis rests on an assumed answer to an
unasked question, and the assumed answer is almost certainly
wrong.
II
The provision of automobile insurance in the marketplace involves an economic exchange: drivers wishing to be insured
8. Pa. -, 482 A.2d. at 546.
9. Id. at 547.
10. Id. at 548 (citing Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson, 470 Pa. 290, 368 A.2d
635 (1977); Adoption of Walker, 468 Pa. 165, 360 A.2d 603 (1976); Butler v. Butler, 464 Pa.
522, 347 A.2d 477 (1975); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 462 Pa. 216, 340 A.2d 440 (1975);
DiFlorido v. DiFlorido, 459 Pa. 461, 331 A.2d 174 (1975); Commonwealth v. Butler, 458 Pa.
289, 328 A.2d 851 (1974); Henderson v. Henderson; 458 Pa. 97, 327 A.2d 60 (1974); Conway
v. Dana, 456 Pa. 90, 320 A.2d 139 (1974). None of these cases touches on the issue raised
within this note-that the recognition of differences between men and women is necessary
to avoid discrimination.
11. 482 A.2d at 549. The court noted that the Commissioner not only "is charged with
the execution of the Rate Act [but also has] sworn to uphold the Constitution and laws of
this Commonwealth." Id.

624

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 23:621

purchase coverage, exchanging dollars for a policy with specific
provisions on what is covered for a specific period of time. Thus, it
is appropriate to discuss discrimination in auto insurance in terms
of markets and economics. Discrimination is often defined, at least
as a first approximation, as selling the same commodity to different buyers at different prices, and in the instant case Hartford certainly charged different prices for identical insurance coverage to
Mattes and to an otherwise equally placed young female. This definition is the one implicitly adopted by the commonwealth and supreme courts.
The problem with this first-approximation definition is that it is
incomplete and hence possibly, as here, misleading. What if costs
of supply and delivery of the same commodity to different customers differ substantially, say because of different locations of the
two customers, one close to the supplier, the other far away? (The
distance from Hartford, Connecticut, is not a factor in auto rates,
although the location of the insured may be; auto insurance rates
for a Manhattan, Boston or Pittsburgh resident certainly differ
from rates for residents of rural New York, Massachusetts or
Pennsylvania). A purchaser of a ton of steel delivered to Pittsburgh from a Pittsburgh mill should pay less than a purchaser of
an identical ton delivered to Philadelphia, Scranton or State College from that same Pittsburgh mill; the different delivered prices
should reflect different transportation costs. Similarly, products
which are not identical but are "similar" should also exchange at
prices which reflect those differences in product characteristics. We
do not expect Cadillacs and Chevrolets to have the same price.
These examples thus contain a warning: prices should reflect costs
of supplying the "identical" commodity.
Consider a second kind of example, one involving identical
prices: the delivery of a letter from the sender to the recipient
within the United States for .22. Certainly the cost of delivery of a
letter from Philadelphia to Harrisburg is considerably less than the
cost of delivery for an identical letter from Philadelphia to
Anchorage or Honolulu or even Erie. We would probably agree
that if Chevrolets and Cadillacs carried the same price, discrimination would be involved. These examples thus contain a second
warning: prices which are "equal" but do not reflect differences in
cost thus embody discrimination, despite their equality in price.
These two examples suggest that costs (of production and transportation-costs of supplying a commodity to a customer) should
be reflected in the prices that customers pay; where costs are high
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prices should be high, and where costs are low prices should be
low. Otherwise discrimination will exist. Different prices to different customers, despite identical costs of supplying those customers,
involves discrimination; similarly, identical prices to different customers, despite different costs of supplying those customers, also
involves discrimination. A more appropriate, accurate, and helpful
definition of discrimination (than the first-approximation) requires
a reference to costs. Nobel Laureate George Stigler defines discrimination "as the sale of two or more similar goods [to different
customers or in different markets] at prices which are in different
ratios to marginal cost."' 2 The leading study of discrimination in
price includes the following definition: "price discrimination
should be defined as implying that two varieties of a commodity
are sold (by the same seller) to two buyers at different net prices,
the net price being the price (paid by the buyer) corrected for the
cost associated with the product differentiation [by location, time,
or quality]. ' 13 It is thus naive and unrealistic to define discrimination without reference to costs, as the court has done implicitly in
Hartford. The "unfairly discriminatory" language of the Rate Act
can easily and properly be interpreted as rates not adequately related to costs of providing insurance.
Actuarial studies in insurance embody a sophisticated attempt
to identify the costs associated with supplying the product, insurance, to specific customers. The nature of the product involves
probabilities-of loss, should an accident occur, or of no loss,
should no accident occur. In addition to these probabilities, the
costs of supplying insurance also involve probability calculations of
accident severity and hence the amounts of possible claims. Statistical evidence clearly indicates that young men have more and bigger accidents than young women; costs of providing insurance to
young men are thus higher than those costs for young women, and
12. G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 209 (1966). Stigler notes: "Price differences do
not necessarily indicate discrimination . . . . Conversely, price equality does not demonstrate the absence of discrimination." Id. The author of the leading text in the economics of
industrial organization defines discrimination thus:
No simple, all-inclusive definition of price discrimination is possible. Succinctly, price
discrimination is the sale (or purchase) of different units of a good or service at price
differentials not directly corresponding to differences in supply cost. Note that this
definition includes not only the sale of identical product units to different persons at
varying prices, but also the sale of identical units to the same buyer at different
prices . . . and the execution of transactions entailing different costs at identical
prices . . ..
F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 315 (1980).
13. L. PHLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION 6 (1983).
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the prices of providing such insurance should reflect those differences in costs. Not to do so, as the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
now requires, is the equivalent of requiring the insurance indugtry
to discriminate by sex in the provision of automobile insurance to
young people. There may have been an element of discrimination
by sex prior to Hartford; now the gender discrimination will certainly be increased, and likely by a substantial amount.
If one is not convinced by this argument, consider the extreme
case. Assume that young women without exception are cautious
and safe drivers, rarely involved in accidents, and incur very low
claims against their insurance policies. Assume also that young
men by contrast and with few exceptions, are reckless and dangerous drivers, frequently involved in accidents; they make substantial claims against their insurance policies. No difference in principle intrudes in this extreme. Is discrimination involved (a) if young
men and young women pay the same insurance rates, or (b) if
young men pay substantially higher rates than young women? The
answer to (a) is certainly yes; the answer to (b) depends on how
closely the rates set for men and women approximate costs: "past
and prospective loss experience within and outside the Commonwealth, . . . underwriting practice and judgment, . . . catastrophe
hazards, . . . a reasonable margin for underwriting profit and contingencies, . . dividends, savings or unabsorbed premium deposits, . . . past and prospective expenses"; in short, costs as allowed
by section 3(a) of the Rate Act and as allowed by the classification
schemes of section 3(c). 1 4 So, when the majority writes, "Unquestionably, sex discrimination in this Commonwealth is now unfair
discrimination,"1 5 the court is failing to recognize that for nondiscriminatory treatment to exist, different prices on insurance should
be charged to young men and women; the coverage is provided at
different costs, because there are basic differences in accident histories between the two groups. "Sometimes the grossest discrimination can lie in treating things that are different as though they
were exactly alike."' 6
14.
15.
16.

482 A.2d at 544-45.
Id. at 549.
Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971). See also THE PRICING AND MARKETINC. OF INSURANCE: A REPORT OF THE U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE TO THE TASK GROUP ON ANTITRUST
IMMUNITIES 308-09 (1977): "It is not 'unfair' discrimination to offer insurance at a lower
premium to persons who have a lower expense cost than others. In fact, the failure to grant
a preference in rates reflecting the expense differential results in unfair discrimination."
And, "We have already examined the question of unfair discrimination, concluding that
fairness requires that prices be reasonably related to costs." Id. at 328.
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In a concurring opinion in Hartford, Justice Flaherty, with Justice Hutchinson joining, writes "to emphasize that, were it not for
the Equal Rights Amendment, Pa. Const. Art. I, § 28, resort to
gender-based insurance rate classifications would not be 'unfairly
discriminatory' under 40 P.S. § 1183(d) (1971), since such classifi-*
cations may indeed be actuarially sound."1 7 That is, the "people's
will on gender-based classifications," as expressed in the Equal
Rights Amendment, prohibits different insurance rates for equal
coverage, despite different costs of coverage for young men and
women.
Thus, sex cannot be used as a consideration in rate setting, even
to avoid actual discrimination based on cost differences. The Equal
Rights Amendment, however, is written in the most general of
terms: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because of the sex
of the individual." 8 Interpreting the amendment, the court quoted
Henderson v. Henderson: "The thrust of the Equal Rights Amendment is . . .[to] eliminate sex as a basis for distinction . . . .The
law will not impose different benefits or burdens upon the members of a society based on the fact that they may be man or woman."" But surely the new requirement, that insurance rates become equal for young men and young women despite cost
differences, automatically imposes different "benefits" and "burdens" based on sex. The burden will (with equal insurance rates)
now fall more heavily on women: the benefits will accrue to men,
and the costs and benefits falling to young men and women will
fall in unequal proportions, that is, will fall in a discriminatory
manner. Put another way, there will now be a redistribution of income or wealth from women to men. Surely this is not what the
Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment means; nor, I suspect, is it
what Pennsylvania voters thought they were voting for when they
adopted the Equal Rights Amendment.
IV
Two Justices, McDermott and Zappala, dissented in Hartford,
each joining the other's opinion. Justice McDermott emphasized
the importance of costs in determining rates, to avoid "unfair dis17. 482 A.2d at 550.
18. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 28.
19. 458 Pa. 97, 101, 327 A.2d 60, 62 (1974).
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crimination" prohibited by the Rate Act. He noted the differences
in accidents for those 25 to 29 years old: 7.28 accidents per one
hundred licensed male drivers in Pennsylvania (presumably per
year), compared with 2.96 accidents per one hundred licensed females. He also noted the differences in losses-annual costs of accidents-for unmarried males and females aged 17 to 20 ($195 to
$255).2o Requiring equal rates, he concluded, "unfairly treats as

alike those who are, at least on the highways, demonstrably different."" The Commissioner thus exceeded his power under the Rate
Act: "The basic policy behind the Act was set: that there must be a
reasonable relationship between proposed insurance rates for a
particular class and the risk [cost] posed by members of that
class."22 As Justice McDermott also noted, twice in the years after
the Equal Rights Amendment was, passed (1971), the legislature
had the opportunity "to outlaw the usage of gender-based classifications in insurance rates but specifically chose not to do so.''23

Justice Zappala's opinion distinguished other cases in which the
supreme court had condemned "sexual stereotypes . .

.

. We

[have] rejected the employment of presumptions which were based
upon social prejudice or meritless characteristics ascribed to a
class. 12 4 He embraced fully the notion that costs for a class, even

based on gender, should be reflected in rates: "It is not unfairly
discriminatory, however, to treat individuals who are not in the
same position differently. It is self-defeating to suggest that similar
individuals should be treated as such not only where differences do
not exist, but also that they should be treated as the same where
differences undeniably do exist. '2 5 And here differences do ex-

ist-"not those which are presumed or manufactured to reinforce
social prejudices." "[In our zeal to rectify perceived discrimination, we may create discrimination."
A puzzling footnote in Justice McDermott's opinion, however,
suggests that the full meaning of the relationship between costs
and prices, to avoid discrimination, may have escaped him: "Insur20. 482 A.2d at 553.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 554.
23. Id. In a footnote Justice McDermott noted "that the Commissioner adjudicated
this case in the face of an Insurance Commission regulation which prohibits insurers from
denying benefits or coverage on the basis of sex, but specifically 'does not prohibit insurers
from differentiating in premium rates between sexes where there is sound actuarial justification.'" 482 A.2d at 554 n.9 (citing PA. ADMIN. CODE § 145.1 (1977)).
24. 482 A.2d at 556.
25. Id. at 557.
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ance rate classification inherently envisions some discrimination.
In this uneven world, some urban areas generate more occasion for
accident. Persons living in them by choice or necessity bear higher
premiums. The ideal classification would be homogeneous, practical and objective, so the factors would be beyond manipulation."'2 6
Either this is a comment on the impossibility of complete classification, to make each class or group completely homogeneous
within that class or group (a correct statement), or it is a minor
7
slip at variance with the rest of his dissent.1

V.
In 1944 Federal antitrust laws were been held applicable to the
insurance industry,2 8 and Congress acted promptly to prevent such
application.29 As Justice McDermott argues, "The [McCarran-Ferguson] Act. . . was passed to shield insurers against antitrust enforcement under the Robinson-Patman Act which was partially
aimed at inhibiting unfair price differences. ' 30 In fact the Robinson-Patman Act declared it to be unlawful "to discriminate in
price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade
and quality . . . where the effect of such discrimination may be
26. Id. at 551 n.1.
27. The same point is made in the context of mortality tables for life insurance and
annuities:
Grouping males and females together will not eliminate the application of averages
to individuals, and it in fact will actually aggravate rather than alleviate any unfair
discrimination. In insurance, one of the purposes of grouping smaller (i.e. by age and
by sex), rather than larger (i.e. combining sexes and/or ages), is to try to determine
averages that more closely resemble the individual characteristics and individual
mortality of the members. Grouping larger makes members less alike rather than
more alike . . . . The larger the group, the more dissimilar the individuals are to the
average, and the more unfairly discriminatory is the grouping. Therefore, separate
male and female tables come closer to having averages which fairly represent individuals than do male and female combined tables.
Lautzenheiser, Sex and the Single Table: Equal Monthly Retirement Income for the Sexes,
2 EMPLOYEE BENEFITS J. 8 (1976) (cited recently in Brief for Defendant-Appellant United
States, Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. United States, No. 84-6051 (2d Cir., argued
June 15, 1984)). For a discussion of discrimination in the field of annuities, see Miller, How
to Discriminate by Sex: Federal Regulation of the Insurance Industry, 17 CONN. L. REv.
(forthcoming 1985).
28. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
29. 59 Stat. 33, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1983).
30. 482 A.2d at 552 (footnote omitted). Actually, the South-Eastern Underwriters
case was aimed principally against the cartel activities of insurance companies appearing
before state insurance commissions, which since the 1880's had been exercising the regulatory authority abandoned to them by the federal government. South-Eastern Underwriters,
to the surprise of the insurance companies and the state regulators, found that propertyliability insurance was in interstate commerce.
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substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly
. .
" But there is an important proviso, termed the "cost defense": "Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent
differentials [in price] which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from
the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are
to such purchasers sold or delivered . . . . 31 Thus Robinsor-Patman, from which insurers were freed by McCarran-Ferguson, at
least recognizes the possibility that differing costs may be used to
justify different prices to different customers; notwithstanding this
acknowledgment, sex-based differences in insurance policies (and
presumably prices of all other products-hair cuts?) are now outlawed in Pennsylvania, despite cost differences.
VI
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has thus declared the use of
gender classifications to set insurance rates illegal under the Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment. This prohibition will not reduce or eliminate discrimination in insurance pricing; instead it
will engender increased discrimination, since cost differences between the sexes cannot be considered by actuaries in pricing insurance coverage. Gender, at least in Pennsylvania, is no longer a variable to be allowed. This policy treats unequals as equals in the
name of equality of treatment. One hopes that Pennsylvania policy
makers do not outlaw completely any consideration of differences
between men and women.

31. Act of June 19, 1936, 15 U.S.C. § 13, amending Section 2 of the Clayton Act of
1914, which also contained a cost defense, albeit a more liberal one.

